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mAbstract
In this paper, we review published studies to assess the influence of time
preferences on human health behaviour. Our review indicates that elicited discount
rates for health have been found to be higher than those for money in both the
social and private context. We discuss the importance of discount rates for public
policy since high time discount rates can contribute to governmental emphasis on
acute health care, rather than preventive health care. We then examine how time
preferences interrelate with specific health concerns such as smoking or obesity. We
find that even when time preferences are elicited in the monetary domain, they can
be successful in predicting smoking cessation and likewise for obesity. We also
discuss how time preferences relate with teen risk taking behavior.
JEL codes: D91, I0
Keywords: Time preference; Health domain; Risk aversion; Discount rate; Health
behaviourIntroduction
Often in life, individuals are faced with the choice of immediately consuming or waiting
to consume a good. In other words, one chooses between immediate gratification and de-
layed gratification. Usually, when one chooses to wait, it is because through waiting, one
may be able to receive a larger reward. For example, saving money to buy a new car can
both earn interest while the money is being saved and save interest costs once the car is
purchased. Through waiting, one is able to save money and then use it to gain additional
utility through the consumption of additional goods. This exemplifies the concept of time
preference. Standardly defined, time preference is the amount of future utility that is
equivalent to the current utility of consuming a good or service. Time discount rates ex-
press the amount of future utility necessary to compensate an individual for waiting.
Research on time preferences and health outcomes has conventionally had applica-
tions in shaping public policy, explaining psychological decision making, and uncover-
ing motivations behind seemingly irrational health behaviours (Chapman 2003).
Indeed, time preferences play a major role in the ways our decisions shape our health
and our lives. Understanding the impact of time preferences and how to best capture
them is a primary goal of time preference research. Much work on time preferences
has focused on theoretical modeling (see Andersen et al. 2011, for a review of the alter-
native models that have been proposed in the literature as well as on a plethora of em-
pirical applications). In a well cited paper, Frederick et al. (2002) provided a review of
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Chapman (2003) has addressed as well. This paper will not attempt to repeat either of
these comprehensive works; rather, they are complemented here through a review of
post-2002 work that profiles the influence of time preferences on human (health) behav-
iour. Specifically, our objectives in this paper are:
1) Explain how the societal time discount rate differs from the private time discount
rate;
2) Determine how time discount rates sway governments;
3) Assess how time discount rates affect decision making in regard to risky behaviours
such as becoming obese, smoking, and engaging in risky sexual behaviour; and
4) Discuss the repercussions of time preferences on prevention of poor health.
In general, the time preference literature should be of particular importance to agri-
cultural and food economists whenever an inter-temporal trade-off decision is at place.
This would cover much of everyday food consumption (e.g., eat this piece of cake
now vs. postpone eating it), to agricultural farming decisions (e.g., how much of
the underground water reserves to use today) as well as health-related decision making
(e.g., smoking decisions).
The articles included in our review are related to either social or private discount
rates, time preferences and the developing world, or risky health behaviour.a We also
included papers with time preference and human behaviour components. Given the re-
view by Frederick et al. (2002), papers published before 2002 were sometimes included
to explain results from works published during or after 2002.
Review
Current time preference elicitation methods
Frederick et al. (2002) identified field and laboratory experimental studies as the two
main categories of research on time preference. In laboratory experimental studies, the
elicitation mechanisms used include choice tasks, matching tasks, rating tasks, and pri-
cing tasks. On one hand, field studies, can represent real world behavior, although the
likelihood of confounds is high due to the difficulty in controlling all factors that affect
time preferences. An example of a field study is the work by Shanmugam (2006), in
which discount rates were estimated using data about the risk levels in certain jobs in
India.
Among the experimental elicitation mechanisms (i.e., choice, matching, rating, and
pricing) typically used in time preference lab studies, choice tasks (i.e., discrete choice
experiments) are the most common (Frederick et al. 2002). In these tasks, individuals
choose between a smaller, more immediate award and a more desirable delayed award.
Sometimes, these choices are made in the monetary domain and then compared to ac-
tual health-related behavior (Chesson et al. 2006). Alternatively, the choices relate to
hypothetical health scenarios in which participants much choose their most preferred
option (Hardisty and Weber 2009).
Matching tasks are also referred to as open-choice experiments, which usually entail
a “fill in the blank” approach (Frederick et al. 2002, p. 387). Participants are given a sce-
nario and must find the delayed equivalent of that scenario (Frederick et al. 2002).
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such as smoking status (Khwaja et al. 2007).
Unfortunately, the experimental elicitation mechanism itself can contribute to dif-
fering measured time discount rates as a meta-analysis study has shown (Percoco and
Nijkamp 2009). A comparison of close-ended and open-ended time preference elicitation
mechanisms showed that close-ended mechanisms elicit lower mean discount rates, al-
though there is consistency between social and private discount rates and between dis-
count rates and individual traits (van der Pol and Cairns 2002).
In rating tasks, individuals indicate how attractive a particular situation is. When this
type of method is compared to others, the way in which individuals use the scale and
the elicitation method has been shown to explain some of the variance in time prefer-
ence studies, although health states seem to explain the largest percentage of variance
(Essink-Bot et al. 2007). Less commonly used are pricing tasks in which individuals are
asked how much they are willing to pay for a specified event at a specified time.
All of these methods have advantages and disadvantages, some of which are perhaps
more pronounced in the health domain. The next section explores some weaknesses of
the current methods and potential improvements for the next generation of time pref-
erence elicitation methods.
Possible improvements to time preference elicitation methods
There are several issues which make time preference elicitation methods for health out-
comes less straightforward than those for monetary outcomes. For one, elicitation
mechanisms that involve monetary trade-offs can be made non-hypothetical because
researchers can choose to make one or all of the choices made in the experiment bind-
ing.b On the other hand, health tradeoffs can only be hypothetical in nature due to a
number of ethical and practical reasons. For instance, a scientist cannot enforce the
choices one makes about health in a time preference experiment. Frederick et al. (2002)
reviewed the limited studies that have compared hypothetical and non-hypothetical
outcomes. In one case, the discount rates from the hypothetical treatments were lower,
but the hypothetical and non-hypothetical experiments were designed differently (Kirby
and Maraković 1995). In a second case, the discount rates were lower for real treat-
ments only when censoring was not taken into account (Coller and Williams 1999).
Conceivably, when hypothetical health states are described to participants, some of
those participants have experienced a wider array of health states and thus may be able
to better imagine the state being described. This may be especially true when the hypo-
thetical state is supposed to represent an actual condition, and the subjects in the study
have had or have that condition. For example, in a study which attempted to determine
willingness to pay for a quality adjusted life year (QALY) when the temporary health
state was shingles, those who had suffered from shingles in the past were willing to pay
more (Lieu et al. 2009). Likewise, those who have experienced an adverse condition
place more importance on avoiding it than others who have not experienced the condi-
tion (Baron et al. 2003). This shows that there may be a relationship between experi-
ence and the way individuals respond to a specific hypothetical health state with which
they have had experience. Perhaps there is also a relationship between those who have
had more experience with a wider array of health states and how they respond in these
choice tasks. This may come through age, for example. A sixty-five year old who has
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twenty-five year old that has never had a serious condition or experienced a long hos-
pital stay. Certainly, there are some twenty-five year olds that have had serious health
issues and have more experience than some sixty-five year olds, so this is not a strict
example. Controlling for this experience is a difficult task because the concept is some-
what difficult to define in mathematical terms. Perhaps one could use a proxy such as
days stayed in a hospital overnight or frequency of illness. To our knowledge, this has
not been done before but could be an interesting point for future research.
Additional methods that can be used for time preference elicitation in the health do-
main could be borrowed from time preference elicitation methods used in the monet-
ary domain. For example, Andersen et al. (2008) presents non-hypothetical elicitation
methods for both time and risk preferences. A risk preference elicitation task is in-
cluded because risk aversion can be a potential confound in time preference ana-
lysis (i.e., risk aversion affects the curvature of the temporally dated utility function). In
all of these methods, subjects are presented with a series of choices. In the risk tasks, one
choice represents lesser risk with lesser reward and the other choice represents greater
risk with greater reward. Subjects who are less risk averse will more consistently choose
the riskier gambles. For explanatory purposes, a series of monetary gambles is shown
in Table 1.
We would expect risk seeking individuals to choose Option B in the first few rows
and risk averse individuals to choose Option B in the last few rows. The number of
times someone chooses Option A before switching to Option B could be used as simple
index of risk aversion.c In its simplest form, this number can be added as a covariate in
regression models such as those used in willingness to pay studies. The lotteries shown
in Table 1 are on the lower end of order of magnitudes. Additional tables with tasks of
higher order of magnitudes are typically presented.d To eliminate hypothetical bias, one
row from one set of tasks can be randomly selected as binding.
The elicitation format in Table 1 is known as a Multiple Price List (MPL) format.
Andersen et al. (2008) used a MPL to elicit time preferences as well. For the time
preference elicitation task, subjects choose between two options (a monetary example is
shown in Table 2). One option is more immediate but has a smaller reward. The further
down a subject changes from Option A to Option B, the higher his or her time discount
rate is. Like in the risk preference exercise, this number could be a covariate in regressionTable 1 An example of a risk preference elicitation task
Option A Option B
10% chance of winning $2, 90% of winning $1.60 10% chance of winning $3.85, 90% of winning $0.10
20% chance of winning $2, 80% of winning $1.60 20% chance of winning $3.85, 80% of winning $0.10
30% chance of winning $2, 70% of winning $1.60 30% chance of winning $3.85, 70% of winning $0.10
40% chance of winning $2, 60% of winning $1.60 40% chance of winning $3.85, 60% of winning $0.10
50% chance of winning $2, 50% of winning $1.60 50% chance of winning $3.85, 50% of winning $0.10
60% chance of winning $2, 40% of winning $1.60 60% chance of winning $3.85, 40% of winning $0.10
70% chance of winning $2, 30% of winning $1.60 70% chance of winning $3.85, 30% of winning $0.10
80% chance of winning $2, 20% of winning $1.60 80% chance of winning $3.85, 20% of winning $0.10
90% chance of winning $2, 10% of winning $1.60 90% chance of winning $3.85, 10% of winning $0.10
100% chance of winning $2, 0% of winning $1.60 100% chance of winning $3.85, 0% of winning $0.10
Table 2 An example of a time preference elicitation task
Option A Option B
$300 in 1 month $305 in 4 months
$300 in 1 month $310 in 4 months
$300 in 1 month $315 in 4 months
$300 in 1 month $320 in 4 months
$300 in 1 month $325 in 4 months
$300 in 1 month $330 in 4 months
$300 in 1 month $335 in 4 months
$300 in 1 month $340 in 4 months
$300 in 1 month $345 in 4 months
$300 in 1 month $350 in 4 months
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explicit risk aversion coefficients and discount rates at the individual level using structural
econometric methods. A series of tasks, each with differing orders of magnitude, can be
used. The exercise can be made non-hypothetical using the random lottery incentive
mechanism.
Table 2 presents a MPL of dated amounts of money that correspond to a three
month time horizon. Most often, additional tasks are also administered that vary the
time horizon of the payoffs. In this particular example, both the sooner and the latter
option are delayed. The delay in the sooner amount of money is called a front-end
delay (FED) and has some advantages: first, it avoids the passion for the present that
decision makers exhibit when offered monetary amounts today or in the future; and
second, it allows the researcher to equalize the credibility of future payments. A third
advantage is that it holds the transaction costs of future options constant in case
these are not negligible (see for example the discussion in Coller and Williams
1999). If one decides not to use a FED, then extra care is needed in order to equalize
transaction costs across all time periods, including physical costs. Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012) describe six specific measures to equate transaction costs and ensure payment
reliability.
Time preferences and domain independence
Individuals make intertemporal choices and express preferences in several domains in-
cluding health, money, and the environment. Researchers have found that monetary
and environmental domains may be comparable (Hardisty and Weber 2009). However,
correlations between health and money domains tend to be generally low and re-
searchers refer to this phenomenon as domain independence. Domain independence
may be problematic because, according to normative discounted utility theory, discount
rates should not change with decision domain (Chapman 2003). For individuals, these
differences do not appear to be a result of different utility functions for health and
money (Chapman 1996) or familiarity with health situations (Chapman et al. 1999).
Possibly, individuals do not consider health and money ‘fungible’, or tradable. In public
health policy, however, health and money are more easily viewed as fungible because in
this case, policy makers are making monetary investments to garner future health bene-
fits (Chapman 2003). Not surprisingly, the issue of domain independence is a point of
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rate can be used for both domains. However, since it is conceivable that individuals
may not value their health and money in the same way, then arguments for using dif-
ferential discount rates seem warranted. Lazaro (2002) reviewed arguments for both
concepts and concluded that neither can be fully accepted without reservation. Lazaro
suggests, however, that empirical evidence should be the determinant in choosing
which framework to adopt. For example, Lazaro et al. (2002) examined the time prefer-
ences of a representative Spanish sample and found that health outcomes are dis-
counted at a higher rate than monetary outcomes.
The literature suggests that a contributing factor to domain independence is the
temptation associated with a particular domain. For example, beer drinkers who are
not chip lovers have high discount rates for beer but low discount rates for chips in
part because they are more tempted by beer. The increased visceral attraction to a par-
ticular domain may entice a “hot” state, similar to what a cigarette addict experiences
when s/he craves a cigarette (Tsukayama and Duckworth 2010).
Societal and private time discount rates
Time preferences play a critical role in developing public health policy. When we speak
of time preferences and public policy, we must distinguish between individual time
preferences and social time preferences. Private time preferences refer to an individual’s
decisions, while societal time preferences refer to society’s preferences for others’ well-
being. When making public policy decisions, the social discount rate is usually regarded
as an appropriate measure to use (Drummond et al. 1987; Olsen 1993). Some studies
have shown that discount rates for health were higher than those for money in both
the social and private context (Lazaro et al. 2001, 2002), although more recent evidence
indicates that social time discount rates for health were lower than social time discount
rates for money (Meerding et al. 2010). As Cairns (2001) points out, the differences
could be attributed to differing sample populations or differing methods of framing
time preference. For example, in the case of higher discount rates for health, there is
the possibility that when health outcomes are delayed, subjects are less certain of
those outcomes than they are when the delay is associated with monetary outcomes
(Chapman 2003). Social and individual discount rates within the health domain, however,
seem to be similar (Cairns and van der Pol 2000; van der Pol and Cairns 2002).
Another issue to consider when using time preferences to develop public policy is
the concept of intergenerational time preference, or in other words, how the utility of
the current generation is to be weighed against the utility future generations will ex-
perience. The role of the government to protect future generations at the expense or
sacrifice of the current generation that elected it, is a point of debate (see Frederick
2006 for a review). Perhaps most important to understand is that the individual dis-
count rate and the intergenerational discount rate are not readily interchangeable.
Time preferences and governments
Understanding time preferences is vital to understanding governmental policy. For ex-
ample, high time discount rates contribute to governmental emphasis on acute care, ra-
ther than preventative care. Of course, there are facets of governmental policy other than
time preferences that can further complicate public policy decision making. Subsidizing
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treatments and overconsumption of treatments in general, respectively (Watts and Segal
2009). Understanding these interplaying factors can help frame the discussion of
public policy.
Developing and developed countries generally have specific public policy decisions
that are partially explained by time preferences. Time preferences can help explain how
countries make allocation decisions to specific programs. An example is the AIDS pan-
demic in Eastern Africa, considered one of the biggest public policy challenges in the
developing world. Prevention strategies include the development of an AIDS vaccine
and the distribution of condoms. Governments with high societal discount rates do not
readily invest in prevention while governments that value the future would have low
discount rates and would be likely to invest in prevention. For example, distribution of
condoms as a prevention strategy, is only cost effective if the condoms are distributed
to specific at-risk groups (Fleßa 2003).
Developed countries can also face similar dilemmas, although they usually deal with
non-pandemic situations when it comes to health. Some recent results from a large-
scale international survey on time discounting conducted in 45 countries indicate
strong evidence for cultural differences, as measured by the Hofstede cultural dimen-
sions (Wang et al. 2011). In this study, high levels of “Uncertainty Avoidance” or
“Individualism” were both associated with strong hyperbolic discounting.
We summarized the published health discount rates in developing countries in
Table 3. Robberstad (2005) elicited time discount rates from Tanzanians for a hypothet-
ical health state linked to malaria. Discount rates were lower for the more severe
malarial-like illness, which would be evidence of an absolute magnitude effect where
higher discount rates are associated with smaller outcomes (Andersen et al. 2013).
Robberstad (2005) suggested that separate discount rates for non-fatal and fatal ill-
nesses are perhaps more appropriate than assigning one discount rate to each condition.
Evidence for the magnitude effect and the common difference effecte (where time
preference rates and time spans are inversely correlated) was demonstrated in a
similar study that compared several discounting models (Robberstad and Cairns
2007). This study found that hyperbolic discounting models specifically those of
Mazur (1987) and Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), fitted the data better. In this ex-
ample, the authors observed that the choice of model could have significant impli-
cations on final public policy decisions. Namely, the discounted utility model at a
3% discount rate more heavily emphasized immediate health solutions than did the
hyperbolic model (Robberstad and Cairns 2007).
In addition to analyzing time discount rates, identifying factors that relate to discount
rates is an important area of research. A study which was performed in South Africa,
an area “with high morbidity and mortality”, found that health and survival probability
had significant relationships with subjective discount rates (Chao et al. 2009). Those in
very good health, very poor health and those who expressed great certainty or uncer-
tainty about how long they would live, had high discount rates. In other words, health
and survival probability had a u-shaped relationship with the subjective discount rate
(Chao et al. 2009).
In developed countries such as the United States, investment in health research can po-
tentially improve health outcomes across the income spectrum by improving treatment







Delay of condition Elicitation method Model Sample size Health state
description
Hypothetical? Country Study
0.071 0.068 3-6 yrs Open-ended
stated preference
Discounted utility n = 224 for Pd Malarial-like disease Hypothetical Tanzania (Robberstad 2005)
n = 226 for Sd
0.122* 0.122* 3-6 yrs Open-ended
stated preference
Harvey (Hyperbolic) 450 pooled sample Non-fatal but
will miss work
Hypothetical Tanzania (Robberstad and
Cairns 2007)
0.101* 0.101* 3-6 yrs Open-ended
stated preference
Mazur (Hyperbolic) 450 pooled sample Non-fatal but
will miss work
Hypothetical Tanzania (Robberstad and
Cairns 2007)
0.121* 0.121* 3-6 yrs Open-ended
stated preference
L&P (Hyperbolic) 450 pooled sample Non-fatal but
will miss work
Hypothetical Tanzania (Robberstad and
Cairns 2007)






years lost by weighted
non-linear least squares
522 N/A Non-hypothetical India (Shanmugam 2006)
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preventative measures such as the AIDS vaccine could have great value in developing na-
tions. Understanding the interplaying psychological factors that contribute to changes in
time preference is critical for establishing appropriate public policy.
Time preferences and risky behaviour
Countries are continually faced with public health concerns, particularly because their
citizenries often undertake risky health behaviours. Among these are smoking, being
overweight or obese, and participating in risky sexual behaviour, which all contribute to
government expenditures on healthcare. Sexual education programs designed to de-
crease risky sexual behaviour, anti-smoking initiatives, and anti-obesity campaigns are
common in many countries due to the financial burdens that these behaviours incur.
In many western countries, obesity is an especially challenging public health issue.
Food-related patterns/habits and their relationship to time preferences is potentially
important because intertemporal food choices affect behaviours that can lead to obes-
ity. For example, preferences for immediate gratification over future health benefits
contradict most weight control methods that require forgoing current consumption of
unhealthy foods. Knowledge of the specific factors that drive time preferences can
therefore be an important tool in shaping public health policies related to food con-
sumption (e.g., Komlos et al. 2004; Smith et al. 2005; Zhang and Rashad 2008).
Time preferences and obesity
In the United States, the obesity problem is of primary importance because obesity is
the second leading cause of preventable deaths (Mokdad et al. 2004) due to its contri-
bution to higher incidences of heart disease and diabetes (Colditz 1992). The figures
are comparable for Europe. The rise of obesity is often attributed to technological
change, although some authors have also suggested that an increase in time preference
rates is also to be blamed (Lakdawalla and Philipson 2009; Philipson and Posner 2003;
Komlos et al. 2004).
When judging whether a change in time preference has increased obesity rates, many
measures of impatience are usually examined. These measures are considered time
preference proxies. Among these are savings rates, which have fallen, and credit card
debt, which has risen (Blaylock et al. 1999). To further examine the relationship be-
tween personal savings and obesity, Komlos et al. (2004) compared obesity prevalence
and lagged personal savings in the US and found that as obesity increased by 112%,
personal savings fell by 83% during the last three decades of the twentieth century.
Additionally, obesity prevalence and lagged debt-to-income ratio showed similar trends;
the debt-to-income ratio accelerated during the 1980s and 1990s as did obesity preva-
lence. When comparing countries, those with higher net domestic savings rates have
lower incidences of obesity and vice-versa. The culmination of this evidence supports
the likely relationship of time preference and obesity, although the authors caution that
causal relationships cannot be determined from it. More work is needed to explain why
certain subgroups (e.g., women) have more prevalent obesity rates than others (Komlos
et al. 2004).
In Table 4, we summarize the time preference proxies and elicitation methods used
in the obesity studies discussed in this review.
Table 4 Time preference proxies and elicitation methods in obesity studies
Study Subject Elicitation Method/Proxies
(Ayyagari et al. 2011) Diabetes Management (Obesity) Agreement to “I live life one day at a
time and don’t think much about the future”
(Sloan et al. 2009) Diabetes Management (Obesity) Agreement to “I live life one day at a time
and don’t think much about the future”
(Zhang and Rashad 2008) Obesity Time preference proxies: degree of
willpower and “desire but no effort”
(Komlos et al. 2004) Obesity Time preference proxies: Savings
and debt-to-income ratio
(Huston and Finke 2003) Obesity Time preference proxies: “Level of formal
education, smoking, exercising and using
nutrition labels on a regular basis, and
the degree of nutrition knowledge…”
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Smoking presents an especially interesting case study because of the persistently high
smoking rates in many countries. We first review the theories under which individuals
make the decision to smoke in light of its potentially negative consequences. We then
discuss related work from UK, the United States, Japan, and Korea.
Cawley (2008) and Sloan and Wang (2008) discuss three economic models which at-
tempt to explain an individual’s choice to participate in addictive behaviour: perfectly
rational addiction (introduced by Becker and Murphy 1988), imperfectly rational addic-
tion, and irrational addiction. Cawley (2008) synthesizes addictive behaviour into three
important tenets: tolerance, withdrawal, and reinforcement. Tolerance drives dissatis-
faction with the current level of consumption. Withdrawal contributes to an aversion
of quitting because of the negative feelings associated with cessation. Reinforcement
encourages increasingly higher consumption because individuals continually derive sat-
isfaction from consuming an extra unit of a good. Ferguson (2006) provides a very de-
tailed discussion about the rational theory of decision-making in the health domain.
The imperfectly rational model can be partially explained in terms of hyperbolic dis-
counting, which, unlike exponential discounting, accounts for changing time preference
rates. Under hyperbolic discounting, smokers experience an increasing time discount
rate as cessation approaches. Besides time-inconsistent preferences, under the imper-
fectly rational model, individuals may also “misperceive probabilities of harms following
from their current behaviours, have cognitive difficulties in forming probabilities or
learning from the experiences of others, and/or have imperfect information about their
own probabilities of becoming addicted” (Sloan and Wang 2008, p .1778). Under the ir-
rational addiction model, decisions about consuming addictive substances are motivated
by emotion, rather than logic. Empirical evidence supports the rational and irrational
models. For example, cigarette prices influence consumption, which could be indicative of
either model type, although impulsivity seems to influence current smokers, which is not
consistent with the rational model (Sloan and Wang 2008). Overall, the best fitting theory
has not been determined, although evidence has been shown to support facets of each.
More empirical work is necessary to fully understand the theoretical underpinnings be-
hind addiction.
Data collected from older English adults attempted to define the relationship between
smoking cessation and time preferences (Adams 2009b). The authors found that as
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though quitting cessation did not show the same pattern. In this study, subjects were
classified by their responses to the question “In planning your/your family’s saving and
spending, which of the following time periods is more important to you and your
husband/wife/partner?” (Adams 2009b, p. 530). Their choices ranged from the next
few weeks to longer than 10 years. As Adams (2009b) points out, this question is
more related to the monetary domain while smoking cessation is related more to
the health domain. Scharff and Viscusi (2011) found that the implied time discount rate
of smokers was higher than that of nonsmokers (i.e., smokers were less future-oriented
than non-smokers) by examining the income individuals received compared to the danger
associated with their job. This method also potentially fails to truly isolate the health and
monetary domains since as previously discussed, time preferences could change for differ-
ent domains. Additionally, a number of omitted variables may be confounding the ana-
lysis, which includes severity of addiction, smoking-associated-disease diagnosis, self
efficacy, information and ideas about the ill-effects of smoking, and social support among
others (Ward et al. 1997). Smoking and time preferences are interrelated with information
and education to the extent that Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (2003) used smoking status
at age 16 to predict future educational attainment. One must note, however, that not
all studies find a significant relationship between time discount rates and smoking.
For example, Harrison et al. (2010), find that male smokers have significantly higher dis-
count rates than male non-smokers, but smoking has no significant effect on discount
rates among women, which may be attributed to differences in the elicitation method
(Khwaja et al. 2007).
When considering time preferences and their role in smoking (especially with regards
to smoking cessation), one should also consider risk aversion, or the likelihood an indi-
vidual will take on more risk in exchange for the possibility of a larger reward (risk
aversion directly affects the concavity of the utility function, see for example Andersen
et al. 2008). Studies using samples of Japanese individuals have found that lower time
discount rates (i.e., more future orientation) and risk aversion predicted quit success
significantly (Goto et al. 2009; Ida and Goto 2009b). The discrete choice method, in
which subjects choose between two different combinations of attributes, allows joint
consideration of risk and time preferences and estimation of actual discount rates and
risk aversion coefficients. A higher time preference rate and lower risk aversion coeffi-
cient was associated with increased likelihood of smoking (Ida and Goto 2009a, b). The
discrete choice method offers more information than studies which use time preference
proxies to determine associations between behaviours and time preferences (Goto et al.
2009). Additionally, use of time preference proxies can potentially confound the ana-
lysis because some behaviours (e.g., smoking) that are associated with time preferences
may also be associated with risk aversion.f Besides smoking, other conditions or behav-
iours such as having too much body weight, not wearing a seatbelt, and drinking heav-
ily have been found to have significant, negative relationships with risk aversion
(Anderson and Mellor 2008). It is therefore quite difficult to separate time preferences
and risk aversion when using proxies.
Through the examination of studies that relate the behaviour of smoking with time
preferences (see Table 5), we find that one of the most important questions asked in
these studies is how to increase the efficacy of smoking cessation programs and prevent
Table 5 Time preference proxies and elicitation methods in smoking studies
Study Subject Elicitation Method/Proxies
(Scharff and Viscusi 2011) Smoking “Workers’ wage fatality risk trade-offs”
(Implied time discount rate for nonsmokers
was 8.1% compared to 13.8% for smokers)
(Ida and Goto 2009b) Smoking Discrete choice experiment to measure
time and risk preferences
(Adams 2009b, p. 530) Smoking Response to “In planning your/your family’s
saving and spending, which of the following
time periods is more important to you and
your husband/wife/partner?”
(Goto et al. 2009) Smoking Discrete choice experiment to measure time
and risk preferences
(Khwaja et al. 2007, p. 935) Smoking Financial Intertemporal Choices; Health Intertemporal
Choices (e.g. “20 extra days in perfect health this
year would be just as good as __ extra days in
perfect health x year(s) from now”)
(Fersterer and
Winter-Ebmer 2003)
Smoking and Education Smoking status at 16 years of age
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an important step mentioned is increasing future orientation (Adams 2009b) and thus
instigating a lower discount rate. Hence, the direction public policy should take, may
depend on the theoretical framework that supports addictive behaviour. If smoking ad-
diction operates under the rational addiction model, then public service programs de-
signed to communicate the harm that smoking causes to others and self might be
beneficial. On the other hand, under the imperfectly rational and irrational models, in-
dividuals will most likely regret their present choices later; thus devices designed to
promote self-control in the present, such as increased smoking taxes and smoking
bans, may be helpful. These devices would also be beneficial under the rational addic-
tion model (Sloan and Wang 2008). Analysis of successful anti-smoking programs
should offer guidance into these policies’ effectiveness. For instance, efforts from the
Korean government in the early twenty-first century seemed to improve quit success
and intention. Among their efforts were the combined effects of increased cigarette
taxes and anti-smoking campaigns (these were not evaluated separately in the model)
(Hong and Collins 2010). In addition, the study demonstrated the role of promoting
general healthy behaviour in public policy. Individuals who exercised more and were
moderate drinkers were found to be more likely to intend to quit smoking (Hong and
Collins 2010).
The interplay between time preferences, health behaviour, and socioeconomic status
The literature discussed above is highly suggestive of a link between time preference
and health-related statuses such as smoking habits (or lack thereof ) and obesity. The
issue addressed here is the interplay among these behaviours in light of potentially con-
founding demographic considerations (summarized in Table 6). In one study, socioeco-
nomic status (as measured by the Index of Multiple Deprivation) was significantly
related to time preferences (as measured by the Consideration of Future Consequences
Scale), smoking status, and BMI (Adams and White 2009). Specifically, time prefer-
ences were found to affect socioeconomic status and BMI, though not smoking status.
In contrast, Adams (2009a) found that socioeconomic status has a role in determining
Table 6 Time preference proxies and elicitation methods in combined smoking and
obesity studies





Health Intertemporal Choices: “20 extra days in
perfect health this year would be just as good as
extra days in perfect health X years from now?
where X was 1, 5, 10 and 20.”
(Adams 2009a, p. 796) Smoking, Obesity
(by physical activity)
Response to “In planning your (family’s) saving
and spending, which of the following time periods
is more important to you and (your partner)?”
(Adams and White 2009) Smoking, Obesity Consideration of Future Consequences Scale
(Robb et al. 2008, p. 1673) Smoking, Obesity Time preference index: “diet choice, vitamin use,
education, smoking status, exercise, nutritional
knowledge, use of nutrition labels and
importance of nutrition”
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not account for any of the education gradient, e.g., the association between the educa-
tion chasm and health behaviours including smoking and being overweight (Cutler and
Lleras-Muney 2010). This finding reinforces the importance of examining time prefer-
ences in light of confounding variables such as socioeconomic status as in Adams and
White (2009) or income, family structure, or health insurance status as in Cutler and
Lleras-Muney (2010).
The relationship between BMI and smoking per se is highly important as well. The
vast majority of longitudinal and cross-sectional work finds an inverse correlation be-
tween smoking and BMI (Klesges et al. 1989), though much of this work fails to ac-
count for the mitigating effects of time preferences. Since time preference has been
found to be an important predictor of BMI (Robb et al. 2008), exclusion of time prefer-
ences in studies examining the link between BMI and smoking can be confronted with
omitted variable bias.
Time preferences and sexual behaviour
Risk-taking sexual behaviours contribute to societal costs both in terms of monetary
expenditures on treating sexually transmitted diseases (STD) (e.g., herpes simplex virus,
HIV, etc.) and the human suffering associated with these diseases. Chesson et al. (2006)
examined the relationship between time discount rates and sexual behaviour. They
found that risky sexual-behaviour-indicators such as ‘having gonorrhea or Chlamydia’,
‘having sex before age 16′, and ‘pregnancy status’ were all significantly associated with
high discount rates. In addition, discount rates were found to decrease with age, which
is in accordance with findings that teenagers greatly discount the future and show little
regard for future health consequences (O'Donoghue and Rabin 2001). Thus, programs
which stress the short-term consequences of STDs may be more effective in encour-
aging young people to pursue healthier choices.
Time preferences and prevention
Knowing that time preferences are related to human behaviours is not enough. Rather, if
we can understand what motivates people psychologically when making intertemporal
choices, we can utilize what we know about time preferences to positively affect public
health and in some cases predict occurrence of diseases. A prevalent public policy issue
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eases that once wreaked havoc around the world. Analyzing the introductions of new vac-
cine programs through time preference measurements is an effective way of gauging their
cost effectiveness.
A meta-analysis performed by Chapman (2005) demonstrates that ‘hot’ or addictive
health behaviours such as smoking have been found to be more associated with time
preference than ‘cold’ behaviours such as vaccination. Other prevention behaviours de-
signed to prevent cervical and breast cancer, such as self-breast exams, mammograms,
and Pap smears, are associated with individuals with higher life expectancy, lower time
preference, and more risk aversion (Picone et al. 2004). Differences in education and
cognitive ability may also partially explain differences in health behaviours including
participation in prevention behaviours (Cawley and Ruhm 2011). The educated
may be better informed about risk factors for a particular disease (e.g., breast can-
cer (Chen and Lange 2008) or perhaps better able to process information from
government-funded prevention campaigns (e.g., HIV/AIDS prevention campaigns in
Uganda (de Walque 2007)).
Nevertheless, the distinction between hot and cold behaviour states plays a major
role in the irrational model of decision making. Hot or visceral states such as hun-
ger or craving have been shown to decrease future orientation (Loewenstein 2005).
Individuals with addictions have experienced more hot states than non-addicts,
which might also contribute to decreased future-orientation even when not in hot
states. Chapman (2005) suggests that time preferences are associated with only
some health behaviours. Therefore, time preferences may be capturing part of an-
other psychological component such as impulsiveness or temptation-withstanding-
ability, though strong evidence exists for the association between time preference
and smoking in particular. Understanding what contributes to the decision to smoke is of
great importance when it comes to cancer control, since smoking is a significant risk fac-
tor for cancer.
Of course, environmental factors, other than smoking, can contribute to cancer.
Thus, individuals often associate programs designed to promote cleaner environments
with reduced disease risks. The costs that individuals are willing to pay today to reduce
the risk of disease in the future can be determined using contingent valuation methods.
For example, in Taiwan, individuals were asked how much they were willing to pay in
increased utility costs to promote cleaner water (and thus a lesser chance of liver
disease) and in increased cost of consumer goods to promote cleaner air (and thus
a lesser chance of lung disease). In both instances, the disease either occurred in a
few months or 20 years later. If the negative consequences are delayed, willingness
to pay to avoid disease will decrease most likely due to present-biased time prefer-
ences. It is also noteworthy that willingness to pay (WTP) is dependent on disease
type (cancer vs. non-cancer), the combination of the organ type (liver vs. lung), en-
vironmental pathway (water vs. air), and payment method (utility bill vs. consumer
goods) (Hammitt and Liu 2004).
Like time preference elicitation methods, WTP elicitation methods are discussed
heavily in the literature. Incorporating WTP in a study that also considers time prefer-
ence is another step in the direction of considering all the interplaying processes that
contribute to human behaviour and decision making.
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In this review, we tried to demonstrate the important role time preferences play in our
everyday lives and in terms of health behaviour in particular. Specifically, we tried to
synthesize the more recent empirical literature on time preferences in the health
domain.
Our literature review illuminates several interesting results as well as potential venues
for future research. First, there is a need for more research that will explore if and how
elicited discount rates in the monetary domain can be applied in the health domain.
There are some indications that time preferences for health may be domain independ-
ent and distinct from time preferences for monetary rewards. However, discount rates
elicited from monetary tasks have the advantage of being elicited under real circum-
stances (i.e., they have real economic consequences) while normally this is not possible
for discount rate tasks that are health domain specific. In this respect, our review indi-
cates that elicited discount rates for health have been found to be higher than those for
money in both the social and private context. Social and individual discount rates
within the health domain, however, seem to be similar but still distinct from those for
monetary outcomes.
Our review also emphasizes the importance of discount rates for policy making since
high time discount rates can contribute to governmental emphasis on acute health care,
rather than preventive health care. Therefore, providing policy makers with accurate es-
timates of societal and/or individual discount rates is extremely important given that
discount rates reflect society’s preferences on how scarce resources should be utilized.
It is also important to remember that the social discount rate, which considers society’s
preferences for others’ wellbeing may not be interchangeable with the individual time
discount rate, which considers an individual’s preferences for himself or herself. Con-
text may also partially determine the influence of time preferences. For example, time
preferences in developing countries may exhibit differing trends from those of devel-
oped countries.
When it comes to specific health concerns like obesity and smoking, our review
shows that there is likely a relationship with time preference, although causality can be
an issue in these types of studies. Some studies have shown that even when time prefer-
ences are elicited in the monetary domain, they can be successful in predicting smoking
cessation or that time preferences along with risk aversion can predict smoking quit
success rates. This is important because it provides policy makers with a potential tool
on how to increase the efficacy of smoking cessation programs and prevent more indi-
viduals from starting to smoke. Similar implications seem to apply for obesity health
concerns. The interplay of smoking and obesity with respect to time preferences is im-
portant (albeit under-researched) since there might be a combined effect on time pref-
erences. This is supported by the fact that many longitudinal and cross-sectional
studies find an inverse correlation between smoking and obesity.
Our review also uncovers how time preferences relate to risky sexual behavior. For
example, teenagers have been found to greatly discount the future and show little re-
gard for future health consequences, which is why it is important to address risk-taking
sexual behaviors. Perhaps the most important part of this analysis is that by exploring
how time preferences change with sexual behavior, one could potentially invent ways
that would reduce risky sexual behavior by altering time preferences.
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nudging time consistent choices. One such tool, known as commitment devices, has
been shown to induce people to become more future-oriented. For example, people
that were offered a savings account, which was closed for withdrawals until a pre-set
date or amount, accumulated 81% more savings than a control group after twelve
months (Ashraf et al. 2006). Another option is to move costs in time. The ‘Save More
Tomorrow’ (SMarT) pension program by Thaler and Benartzi (2004) accomplishes that
by moving the start of the contribution to retirement savings from salary increases to
the future. The average saving rates for SMarT program participants increased from
3.5% to 13.6% over the course of 40 months. The idea of moving costs into the future
has also been successfully applied in the area of charitable giving (Breman 2011). More
research on how to effectively structure choice environments that would nudge people
to be more future oriented in the domain of health, food and agriculture is indeed
warranted.
Endnotes
aOur literature review was based on a Web of Science search using the terms “time
preference(s)”, “behavio(u)r”, “smoking”, “obesity” and “sex”. Several other papers were
identified by performing backward literature searches on the papers from our initial list.
We are confident that all studies of particular importance in the subject area of our
paper were identified and included in the paper.
bThe issue with having binding decisions in an experiment (i.e., decisions with real
monetary consequences) is important since there are evidence of a gap between deci-
sions made under a hypothetical setting and a real setting (e.g., Harrison 2006; Harrison
and Rutstrom 2008a). This gap is commonly referred to as hypothetical bias in the rele-
vant literature.
cAlbeit one can estimate relative risk aversion coefficients using structural economet-
ric methods (Harrison and Rutstrom 2008b).
dAs Drichoutis and Lusk (Drichoutis and Lusk 2012) note, since this task entails
choices made over only four dollar amounts, the task reveals little information about
the curvature of the utility function. Thus, it is necessary to scale up payoffs to allow
for a wider range of dollar amounts, providing more information on the shape of the
utility function. Alternatively, one may want to hold probabilities constant and vary the
dollar amounts (Drichoutis and Lusk 2012; Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre 2013).
eThe magnitude effect and the common difference effect are two of many psycho-
logical biases that influence time discount rates; Chapman (2003) further discusses psy-
chological biases.
fAndersen et al. (2008) show how risk and time preferences are interrelated. In their
experiments they showed that it is essential to have one risk preference elicitation task
for measuring the curvature of the utility function, another task to identify the discount
rate conditional on knowing the utility function, and then jointly estimate the structural
model defined over the parameters of the utility function and discount rate. More
recently, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) extended the methodology proposed by
Andersen et al. (2008) by developing a procedure they called the Convex Time
Budget (CTB) method that does not require a separate risk aversion task to iden-
tify the curvature of the utility function. The procedure involves giving the subject
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http://www.agrifoodecon.com/content/1/1/17100 tokens to allocate between the sooner and later time period, and then varying
the exchange rate between tokens and money for sooner or later amounts. See also
Cheung (2014) for a quibble on Andreoni and Sprenger (2012).
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